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ON THE CONCAVITY OF DELIVERY GAMES
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Abstract
Delivery games, introduced by Hamers, Borm, van de Leensel and Tijs (1994), are
combinatorial optimization games that arise from delivery problems closely related to the
Chinese postman problem (CPP). They showed that delivery games are not necessarily
balanced. For delivery problems corresponding to the class of bridge-connected Euler
graphs they showed that the related games are balanced.
This paper focuses on the concavity property for delivery games. A delivery game
arising from a delivery model corresponding to a bridge-connected Euler graph needs not
to be concave. The main result will be that for delivery problems corresponding to the class
of bridge-connected cyclic graphs, which is a subclass of the class of bridge-connected
Euler graphs, the related delivery games are concave.
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The delivery situations, introduced in Hamers, Borm, van de Leensel and Tijs (1994), are
defined on a connected graph in which a cost function is defined on the edges. For these
situations, which are closely related to the Chinese postman problem (cf. Mei-Ko Kwan
(1962)), they defined a new class of combinatorial optimization games called delivery games.
They showed that these games need not to be balanced. For delivery situations corresponding
to bridge-connected Euler graphs they showed that the related delivery games are balanced.
This paper focuses on the concavity property of delivery games. A game satisfies the
concavity property if the characteristic function of a delivery game is a sub-modular function.
In general a delivery game is not concave, since concavity would imply that the game is
balanced. But even for the class of balanced games corresponding to the delivery problems
that arise from bridge-connected Euler graphs concavity is not necessarily satisfied. We will
show that for delivery games corresponding to the class of bridge-connected cyclic graphs,
which is a subclass of the class of bridge-connected Euler graphs, the related delivery games
are concave.
There are several arguments to ask for convavity. Concave games are balanced, which
means that one can find core-elements prescribing an allocation of the worth of the grand
coalition among the players in such a way that no subgroup has an incentive to split off.
Moreover, Shapley (1971) (cf. Edmonds (1970)) and Ishiichi (1980) showed that the extreme
points of the core are the marginal vectors of the game if and only if the game is concave. Here,
a marginal vector allocates to each player the marginal contribution this player constitutes
according to a given way (a permutation) to form the grand coalition. With respect to one-point
game theoretical solution concepts, concave games are nice since the Shapley value (Shapley
(1953)), which is by definition the average of all marginal vectors, is in the barycentre of the
core. Further, the τ -value (Tijs (1981)), which is an efficient compromise between an utopia
vector and a minimal right vector, can be easily calculated.
Concavity, or its counterpart convexity (super-modular), is a rare property for combinatorial
games. Only two classes of sequencing games, considered in Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs
(1989) and Hamers, Borm and Tijs (1992), are contained in the class of convex games. Other
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combinatorial games, e.g. minimum spanning tree games (cf. Granot and Huberman (1981))
and traveling sales man games (cf. Potters, Curiel and Tijs (1992), do not posses the concavity
property.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the delivery game is formulated and an
example is provided that a delivery game corresponding to delivery problem that arises from a
bridge-connected Euler graph is not necessarily concave. Then the main theorem is formulated.
Section 3 proves the rather technical theorems and lemmata needed for the concavity result.
2 Delivery problems and delivery games
This section describes the class of delivery models and the corresponding delivery games as
introduced in Hamers, Borm, van de Leensel and Tijs (1994). Before the formal description
is provided we need some definitions.Let G = (V,E, i) be an undirected connected graph
where V is the set of vertices, E the set of edges and and i the incidence mapping that assigns
to each edge of E an unordered pair of not necessarily different vertices of V . A walk in
G = (V,E, i) is a finite sequence of edges and vertices of the form v1, e1, v2, ..., ek, vk+1 with
k ≥ 0, v1, ..., vk+1 ∈ V, e1, ..., ek ∈ E such that i(ej) = {vj, vj+1} for all j ∈ {1, ..., k}. Such
a walk is a closed walk if v1 = vk+1. A closed walk in which all edges are distinct is called a
closed trail. A path inG is a walk in which all vertices (except, possibly v1 = vk+1) and edges
are distinct. A closed path, i.e. v1 = vk+1, containing at least one edge is called a circuit.
Let G = (V,E, i) be a connected graph. We assume that each edge corresponds to one
player. Formally, there is a one-one map g : E → N , where N = {1, ..., | E |} is the set of
players. Further, we pick a vertex v0 ∈ V which is called the post office of G. We now define
an S-tour of a coalition S as a closed walk that starts in the post office v0 and visits each edge
that corresponds to a player of S at least once. Formally, we have
Definition 1 Let G = (V,E, i, v0) be a connected undirected graph in which v0 ∈ V is
the post office. Then an S-tour is a closed walk v0, e1, v1, ..., vk−1, ek, v0 in G such that
S ⊂ {g(ej) | j ∈ {1, ..., k}}.
The set of S-tours of a coalition is denoted by D(S).
To the edges of the graph G we assign deliver costs d : E → [0,∞) and travel costs
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t : E → [0,∞). A postman who has to deliver the mail to a coalition S has to pick an S-tour
v0, e1, v1, ..., vk−1, ek, v0 ∈ D(S). Each time the postman visits an edge the travel costs of this
edge is charged. In case the postman makes a delivery in a street the deliver costs of this street
is also charged. Formally, the costs of an S-tour v0, e1, v1, ..., vk−1, ek, v0 are equal to







We assume that in any S-tour each street of S pays its own specific deliver costs and also
once his specific travel costs. Hence, each player of S has individual fixed costs. The sum
of these fixed costs of the members of S is equal to
∑
e∈g−1(S)(t(e) + d(e)) and are called the
non-separable costs of an S-tour. Note that the non-separable costs are independent of the
chosen S-tour. We will call the remaining costs of an S-tour the separable costs of an S-tour.
Consequently, we can rewrite expression (1) as the sum of non-separable costs and separable
costs, i.e.
CS(v0, e1, ..., vk−1, ek, v0) = [
∑
e∈g−1(S)







Since each coalition S wants to be delivered as cheap as possible, it will choose an S-tour in
D(S) that minimizes (2). Since the non-separable costs are independent of the chosen S-tour
coalition S will choose an S-tour in D(S) that minimizes







We call such an S-tour a minimal S-tour.
In the following a delivery problem is denoted by Γ = (N, (V,E, i, v0), t, g). Here,N is the
set of players, (V,E, i, v0) is a connected graph in which v0 is the post office, t : E → [0,∞)
assigns the travel costs to the edges and g gives the one-one correspondence between edges
and players. The class of delivery problems corresponding to the player set N is denoted by
DP (N). Note that the function d : E → [0,∞) which assigns the deliver costs to the edges is
omitted in the description of Γ since it does not affect the choice of a minimal tour (cf. (3)).
Before delivery games are formally introduced we recall some well known facts concerning
cooperative games.A cooperative cost game is a pair (N, c) whereN is a finite set of players and
c is a mapping c : 2N → R with c(∅) = 0 and 2N is the collection of all subsets of N.A game
(N, c) is called concave if for all coalitions S, T ∈ 2N and all i ∈ N with S ⊂ T ⊂ N\{i} it
holds that
c(T ∪ {i})− c(T ) ≤ c(S ∪ {i})− c(S).
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Hence, a game (N, c) is concave if and only if the map c : 2N → R is sub-modular. A core
element x = (xi)i∈N ∈ RN is such that no coalition has an incentive to split of, i.e.∑
i∈N
xi = c(N) and
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ c(S) for all S ∈ 2
N .
The core Core(c) consists of all core elements. A game is called balanced if its core is
non-empty. The results of Shapley (1971) and Ishiichi (1980) give that concavity implies
balancedness.
By defining the cost value of a coalition S as the separable costs of a minimal S-tour, we
obtain a cooperative game corresponding to a delivery problem. This cooperative game is
called the delivery game and is formal defined in following definition.
Definition 2 The delivery game (N, c) corresponding to Γ = (N, (V,E, i, v0), t, g) ∈ DP (N)










The following example illustrates a delivery game and shows that these games need not to
be balanced.
Example 1 Let V = {v0, v1, v2, v3}, E = {e1, e2, e3, e4, e5} and i is defined by i(e1) =






















Let t(e) = 1 for all e ∈ E and g(ej) = j, j ∈ {1, ..., 5}. Then c(N) = 1 since
v0, e1, v1, e2, v2, e3, v3, e4, v0, e5, v2, e5, v0 is a minimal N-tour with separable costs equal to
t(e5) = 1. For all S ∈ A := {{1, 2, 5}, {3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4}} we have that c(S) = 0. Suppose
x ∈ Core(c), then









Contradiction, so no core elements exists.
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Hamers et al.(1994) showed that delivery games arising from delivery problems corre-
sponding to bridge-connected Euler graphs are balanced. An edge b ∈ E is called a bridge of a
connected graphG = (V,E, i) if the graph Ĝ = (V,E −{b}, i|E−{b}) is a disconnected graph.
A connected graph G = (V,E, i) . Then a graph G = (V,E, i) is called a bridge-connected
Euler graph if all the components of the graph Ĝ = (V,E −B(G), i|E−B(G)) are Euler graphs.
Here, B(G) is the set of bridges of G. The following example shows that delivery games
arising from delivery games corresponding to bridge-connected Euler graphs need not to be
concave.
Example 2 Let K7 be the complete graph with seven vertices. Obviously, it is an Euler graph
and, consequently a bridge-connected Euler graph. In figure 1 the notation e1, 1 means that

























































Take the following coalitions: T = {g(e3), g(e4), g(e6)}, S = {g(e3)} and {i} = {g(e2)}.
The minimal T -tour is equal to v0, e6, v4, e3, v5, e4, v6, e5, v0. Hence, c(T ) = t(e5) = 2. The
minimalT∪{i}-tour is equal to v0, e6, v4, e3, v5, e4, v6, e9, v2, e2, v1, e1, v0. Hence, c(T∪{i}) =
t(e1) + t(e9) = 2. The minimal S-tour is equal to v0, e6, v4, e3, v5, e7, v0. Hence, c(S) =
t(e6) + t(e7) = 6. The minimal S ∪ {i}-tour is equal to v0, e6, v4, e3, v5, e8, v2, e2, v1, e1, v0.
Hence, c(S ∪ {i}) = t(e6) + t(e8) + t(e1) = 5. This implies that the delivery game is not
concave, since c(T ∪ {i})− c(T ) = 0 > −1 = c(S ∪ {i})− c(S). 2
The final part of this section states that delivery games corresponding to delivery problems
arising from bridge-connected cyclic graphs are concave games. A graph G = (V,E, i) is
called a bridge-connected cyclic graph if all components of the graph (V,E, i|E−B(G)) are union
of circuits or single vertices. Hence, all circuits in such a graph are edge-disjoint. Note that
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the class of bridge-connected cyclic graph is a subclass of the class of bridge-connected Euler
graphs.
Before the formal proof of this concavity result is presented in the next section we will give
a short description of the construction of this proof. First we show that if the underlying graph
of the delivery problem is a circuit or the union of a circuit and a bridge then the corresponding
delivery game is concave. Second we introduce bridge-connected circuit graphs. These are
the graphs that after removing the bridges only have circuits or single vertices as components.
Hence, here the circuits are vertex disjoint. It is shown with the help of the results on circuit
(with a bridge) graphs and some reduction lemma’s that also delivery games are concave
that arise from delivery problems corresponding to bridge-connected circuit graphs. Finally,
we proof concavity for bridge-connected cyclic graphs by giving an extension of a bridge-
connected circuit graph to a bridge-connected cyclic graph.
Theorem 1 Each delivery game that arises from a delivery problem corresponding to a bridge-
connected cyclic graph is a concave game.
3 Proof main result
For the formal proof we need some new notations. Let DE(N) represent the deliv-
ery problems corresponding to a weakly cyclic graph. We assume in this section that
Γ = (N, (V,E, i, v0), t, g) ∈ DE(N). Take j ∈ N and let e∗ ∈ E be such that g(e∗) = j.
Next, take S ⊂ T ⊂ N\{j} and abbreviate a minimal delivery tour of coalition S,S ∪ {j} T
and T ∪ {j} by d1, d2, d3 and d4, respectively.
Let Γ = (N, (V,E, i, v0), t, g) and let U ⊂ N . Let d = v0, e1, ..., ek, v0 ∈ D(U), then the
separable travel costs of the delivery tour d with respect to U and a subset of edges E′ ⊂ E is
given by a function fΓ,E
′
d : 2










Note that in case d is a minimal delivery tour of U in Γ we have for the corresponding delivery
game (N, c) that c(U) = fΓ,Ed (U) (cf. (4)). For a delivery problem that arises from a circuit
the following lemma shows that in case e∗ 6∈ d1, then there are only three possible tours for d2.
Note that in the following lemma we have three possibilities in which way e∗ can be surrounded
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by a coalition S. The most important one is case (a) in lemma 1). The other two cases, (case
(b) and (c) in lemma 1), will not be considered in this paper, but will be given in lemma 1 for
completeness. (See also the remark after the proof of lemma 1).
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Lemma 1 Let Γ = (N, (V,E, i, v0), g, t) ∈ DE(N) be a delivery problem and let (V,E, i)
be the circuit v0, e1, v1, ..., vm−1, em, v0. Let k be such that ek = e∗. (a) If there exists s1, s2 ∈
S, s1 < k < s2 such that d1 := v0, e1, ..., es1, vs1, e
s1, ..., e1, v0, e
m, ..., es2, vs2−1, e
s2, ..., em, v0
is the unique minimal delivery tour of S, then d2 is one of the following three tours:
v0, e
1, ..., ek, vk, e
k, ..., e1, v0, e
m, ..., es2, vs2−1, e
s2, ..., em, v0 (6)
v0, e
1, ..., es1, vs1, e
s1, ..., e1, v0, e
m, ..., ek, vk−1, e
k, ..., em, v0 (7)
v0, e










































































































































































(b) If there exists s1 ∈ S, s1 < k such that d1 := v0, e1, ..., es1, vs1, e
s1, ..., e1, v0 is the unique
minimal S-tour, then d2 is one of the following three tours:
v0, e
1, ..., ek, vk, e
k, ..., e1, v0 (9)
v0, e
1, ..., es1, vs1−1, e
s1, ..., e1, v0, e
m, ..., ek, vk−1, e
k, ...em, v0 (10)
v0, e
1, ..., em, v0 (11)
(c) If there exists s2 ∈ S, s2 > k such that d1 := v0, em, ..., es2,vs2, e
s2, ..., em, v0 is the unique
minimal S-tour, then d2 is one of the following three tours:
v0, e
m, ..., ek, vk, e
k, ..., em, v0 (12)
v0, e
1, ..., ek, vk, e
k, ..., e1, v0, e
m, ..., es2, vs2 , e
s2, ..., em, v0 (13)
v0, e
1, ..., em, v0 (14)
PROOF: Since the proofs of the cases (b) and (c) are similar to (a), we only provide the
proof of (a). Let u1, u2 ∈ S such that u1 < u2 ≤ s1 or s2 ≤ u1 < u2. Moreover,
for each k ∈ N with u1 < k < u2 we must have k 6∈ S. Consider the delivery tour
d∗ := v0, e
1, ..., eu1,vu1, e
u1, ..., e1, v0, e
m, ..., eu2, vu2−1, e
u2, ..., em, v0. We will show that for
coalition S ∪ {j} the costs of the delivery tour v0, e1, ..., em, v0 are smaller then the costs of
d∗. Hence, the only possible minimal S-tours are the tours (6), (7) or (8). We may assume that
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u1 < u2 ≤ s1. First we derive an inequality which follows from the fact that d∗ is a delivery
tour of S but not a minimal one. We have































Take now for d2 expression (8). Then










































t(e) = fΓ,Ed∗ (S ∪ {j})
where the first inequality follows from (15). Hence, d∗ is not a minimal delivery tour of
S ∪ {j}. This gives that the only three possible minimal delivery tours of coalition S ∪ {j}
are given by (6), (7) or (8). For he special case that u1 = s1 or u2 = s2 we have to
pick for d∗ := v0, em, ..., eu1, vu1 , e
u1, ..., em, v0 or d∗ := v0, e1, ..., eu2, vu2−1, e
u2, ..., em, v0,
respectively. Now we can show in a similar way that d∗ is not optimal. 2 Remark:
In the following we restrict attention to case (a) of lemma 1, i.e. we assume that the edge e∗ is
surrounded by two edges of S. This is possible since the proofs that follow can be elaborated
to the cases (b) and (c) of lemma 1 using the same techniques that will be demonstrated for
case (a).
The following theorem shows that a delivery game corresponding to a delivery problem that
arises from a circuit graph is concave.
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Theorem 2 Let Γ = (N, (V,E, i, v0), g, t) ∈ DE(N) be a delivery problem and let (V,E, i) be
the circuit v0, e1, v1, ..., vm−1, em, v0. Then the corresponding delivery game (N, c) is concave.
PROOF:Let k be such that ek = e∗. Then we have to show that
c(T ∪ {j})− c(T ) ≤ c(S ∪ {j})− c(S). (16)
for S ⊂ T ⊂ N\{j}. We have to consider four cases:(i) ek ∈ d1, ek ∈ d3.It follows that
d1 = d2 and d3 = d4. Consequently,
c(S ∪ {j})− c(S) = c(T ∪ {j})− c(T ) = −t(ek)
Hence, relation (16) is satisfied. (ii) ek 6∈ d1, ek ∈ d3.Since ek 6∈ d1, we have that the delivery
tour d1 is equal to v0, e1, ..., es1, vs1,e
s1, ..., e1, v0, e
m, ..., es2, vs2−1, e
s2, ..., em, v0 where s1 <
k < s2. Since, ek ∈ d2 we have by lemma 1 (a) that d2 is one of the tours given by (6), (7) or
(8). Choosing expression (6) yields























2t(ep) ≥ −t(ek) = c(T ∪ {j})− c(T )
where the last equality follows from d3 = d4. Hence, (16) is satisfied.An analogous result is
obtained when we choose (7) for d2. Finally, choose (8) for d2. Then






























The inequality follows from the fact that e1, ..., em is a delivery tour of S, but not necessarily
a minimal one. Hence, (16) is satisfied. (iii) ek 6∈ d1, ek 6∈ d3Take for d1 the same tour as
in (ii). Consequently, d2 is equal to one of the expressions (6), (7) or (8). Moreover, since
ek 6∈ d3 we have that d3 is equal to v0, e1, ..., et1, vt1, e
t1, ..., e1, em, ..., et2, vt2−1, e
t2, ..., em, v0
where s1 ≤ t1 < k < t2 ≤ s2. Since, ek ∈ d4 we have that d4 is one of the following tours:
v0, e
1, ..., ek, vk, e
k, ..., e1, v0, e
m, ..., et2, vt2−1, e
t2, ..., em, v0 (17)
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v0, e
1, ..., et1, vt1, e
t1, ..., e1, v0, e
m, ..., ek, vk−1, e
k, ..., em, v0 (18)
v0, e
1, ..., em, v0 (19)
Let d2 be equal to (6). Then







2t(ep) ≥ c(T ∪ {j})− c(T ).
The first inequality holds by s1 ≤ t1 and the second inequality holds since (17) is not necessarily
a minimal tour of T ∪ {j}.In case d2 is equal to (7) we obtain a similar result. Finally, take d2
equal to (8), then


































≥ c(T ∪ {j})− c(T )
where the last inequality follows from the fact that e1, ..., em is a delivery tour of T ∪ {j},
but not necessarily a minimal delivery tour. (iv) ek ∈ d1, ek 6∈ d3We will prove that this
case is not possible by showing that if ek 6∈ d3 then ek 6∈ d1. Take for d3 the same tour as
in (iii) and note that we may assume that it is the unique minimal delivery tour. Suppose
d̂ = v0, e1, ..., eu1, vu1, e
u1 , ..., e1, v0, e
m, ..., eu2, vu2−1, e
u2 , ..., em, v0 is a minimal delivery tour
of S that contains ek. Then u2 ≥ u1 ≥ t2 or t1 ≥ u2 ≥ u1 since {et1+1, ..., et2−1} ∩ T = ∅.
































From the facts that v0, e1, ..., em, v0 is a delivery tour of T and d3 is the unique minimal delivery
tour of T we have







































p). Combining this result with inequality










which contradicts inequality (20). Similarly we get a contradiction in case u2 ≤ t1. Hence,
we may conclude that we have a contradiction with the assumption that d̂ is a minimal delivery
tour for S. Consequently, v0, e1, ..., em, v0 is the only possible minimal delivery tour of S that
contains e∗. Then
0 < fΓ,Ed3 (S)− f
Γ,E
v0,e1,...,em,v0
(S) = fΓ,Ed3 (T )− f
Γ,E
v0,e1,...,em,v0
(T ) < 0
and again we have a contradiction. So, ek is not contained in any minimal delivery tour of S
whenever ek 6∈ d3. 2
The following theorem shows that a delivery game corresponding to a delivery problem
that arises from a graph existing of one circuit and one bridge that is not connected to the post
office is concave.
Theorem 3 Let Γ = (N, (V,E, i, v0), g, t) be a delivery problem and let (V,E, i) be a con-
nected graph consisting of the circuit v0, e1, ..., em, v0 and the bridge em+1 that is not connected
to v0. Then the corresponding delivery game (N, c) is concave.
PROOF:Suppose that em+1 is connected to vp with p 6= 0. Consider the
delivery problem Γ′ = (N, (V ′, E, i′, v0), g, t′) where (V ′, E, i′) is the circuit
v0, e
1, ..., ep, vp, e
m+1, v∗, ep+1, vp+1, ..., e
m, v0. Further, t′(ep) = t(ep) for all p ∈ {1, ...,m}
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and t′(em+1) = 0. Let d′3 be a minimal delivery tour of T in Γ
′ and let d′4 be a minimal delivery
tour of T ∪ {j} in Γ′. Then we have that








′ (T ) + t(em+1) if g(em+1) ∈ T
and








′ (T ∪ {j}) + t(em+1) if g(em+1) ∈ T ∪ {j}
Let (N, c′) be the delivery game corresponding to Γ′, then
c′(T ∪ {j})− c′(T ) = c(T ∪ {j})− c(T ) (22)
Using the same arguments for coalition S we have that
c′(S ∪ {j})− c′(S) = c(S ∪ {j})− c(S) (23)
Since the graph in Γ′ is a circuit theorem 2 yields that (N, c′) is a concave game. The concavity
of (N, c) then follows from the expressions (22) and (23). 2
A graph (V,E, i) is called a bridge-connected circuit graph if all the components of the
graph (V,E − B(G), i|E−B(G)) are circuits or single vertices. The class of delivery problems
that arises from bridge-connected circuit graphs is denoted byDC(N). The following theorem
will show that a delivery game corresponding to a delivery problem Γ ∈ DC(N) is concave.
Before we can proof this theorem we need three lemmata which give some relations between
delivery tours of different coalitions.
The first lemma shows that minimal delivery tours of T and T ∪ {j} coincide on the set of
followers of a bridge b ∈ B(G) if e∗ is not a follower of that bridge. Here, e ∈ E is a follower
of a bridge b with respect to v0 if and only if each path v0, e1, ..., ek, vk that contains e also
contains b. The set of followers of b will be denoted by Fb(G, v0).
Lemma 2 Let Γ = (N, (G, v0), g, t) ∈ DC(N). Let b ∈ B(G) be such that e∗ 6∈ Fb(G, v0),




PROOF:If Fb(G, v0) ∩ T = ∅ then d3 and d4 will not visit Fb(G, v0). Hence, we may assume
that Fb(G, v0) ∩ T 6= ∅. Since e∗ 6∈ Fb(G, v0) we have that d3 and d4 have to visit the same
edges of T in Fb(G, v0). Consequencly, both tours will coincide on Fb(G, v0). 2
The next lemma shows that minimal delivery tours of T and T ∪ {j} coincide on the
predecessors of a bridge b if coalition T has a non-empty intersection with Fb(G, v0) and e∗ is
a follower of b.
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Lemma 3 Let Γ = (N, (G, v0), g, t) ∈ DC(N). Then for each b ∈ B(G) such that T ∩




(T ) = fΓ,E−(Fb(G,v0)−{b})d4 (T ∪ {j})
PROOF: Both delivery tours d3 and d4 have to visit the same edges in E − Fb(G, v0) since
e∗ ∈ Fb(G, v0). Moreover, both tours have to visit bridge b since Fb(G, v0) ∩ T 6= ∅. This
implies that both tours have the same costs in E − (Fb(G, v0)− {b}). 2
The last lemma shows that the delivery tours of T ∪ {j} and S ∪ {j} coincide on the
followers of b, excluded that bridge, if no player of T , and consequently no player of S, is a
follower of b.
Lemma 4 Let Γ = (N, (G, v0), g, t) ∈ DC(N) and let b ∈ B(G).If T ∩(Fb(G, v0)−{b}) = ∅




PROOF: If e∗ 6∈ Fb(G, v0) both delivery tours will not visit Fb(G, v0). If e∗ ∈ Fb(G, v0) both
delivery tours will choose from b a shortest path to e∗ since no other edges have to be delivered
inFb(G, v0).Hence, in both cases the delivery toursd2 and d4 have the same costs onFb(G, v0).
2
Before we can give the proof of the following theorem we need the notion of a bridge-
connected line graph. This is a bridge-connected circuit graph such that each circuit is
connected to at most two bridges.
Theorem 4 Let Γ = (N, (G, v0), g, t) ∈ DC(N). Then the corresponding delivery game
(N, c) is concave.
PROOF: Lemma 2 implies that we can reduce the concavity problem to a delivery mod-
el corresponding to a bridge-connected line graph such that e∗ ∈ Fb(G, v0) and b is the












































































































































If e∗ = b then c(T ∪ {j}) − c(T ) = −t(e∗) ≤ c(S ∪ {j}) − c(S). If, on the other
hand, e∗ ∈ Fb(G, v0) − {b}, the following holds. Let Fb(G, v0) − {b} = {e1, ..., em} and
take v∗ such that i(e1) ∩ i(em) ∩ i(b) = v∗. Next, consider the delivery problemΓ =
(A, (V ′, Fb(G, v0), i′, v∗), g|Fb(G,v0)−{b}, t|Fb(G,v0)−{b}) where A = g(Fb(G, v0) − {b}) and
(V ′, Fb(G, v0), i′) is the graph that denotes the circuit described by Fb(G, v0). Let (N, c)
be the delivery game corresponding to Γ. Then









(S ∪ {j})− fΓ,Fb(G,v0)−{b}d1 (T ) ≤ c(S ∪ {j})− c(S)
Here, the first equality follows from lemma 3. The first inequality by the concavi-
ty of (N, c) (cf. theorem 2). (ii) T ∩ Fb(G, v0) = ∅.Let b∗ ∈ B(G) be such that
Fb∗(G, v0) ∩ T 6= ∅ and T ∩ Fb′(G, v0) = ∅ for all b′ ∈ B(G) ∩ (Fb∗(G, v0) − {b∗}).
Let b̂ ∈ B(G) ∩ Fb∗(G, v0) be the bridge that is connected to the set Fb∗(G, v0) −















































Let B := (Fb∗(G, v0) ∪ b̂) − ({b∗} ∪ Fb̂(G, v0)) = {b̂, e
1, ..., em} and take v∗ such that
i(e1)∩ i(em) ∩ i(b) = v∗. Let (V ′, B, i′) be the graph that arises from the set consisting of the
edges of B. Consider the delivery problem Γ = (A, (V ′, B, i′, v∗), g|B , t|B) where A = g(B)
Let (N, c′) be the delivery game corresponding to Γ and let g(b̂) = j∗. Then
c(T ∪ {j})− c(T )


















= c(S ∪ {j})− c(S)
where the first inequality follows from the concavity of (N, c′) (cf. Theorem 3). The second
equality follows from lemma 4. 2
Finally we will show that delivery games corresponding to delivery problems that arise from
bridge-connected cyclic graphs are concave. Recall that bridge-connected cyclic graphs are
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the graphs that after removing the bridges only have cycles or single vertices as components.
A cycle is a circuit or the union of edge-disjoint circuits. It is shown that each delivery
game which corresponds to a delivery model arising from a bridge-connected cyclic graph is
contained in a delivery game arising from a bridge-connected circuit graph. Therefore, we
consider a procedure that extends a bridge-connected cylic graph to a bridge-connected circuit
graph. Consider all kissing points in the bridge-connected cyclic graph. These are the vertices
of a graph that are in the intersection of at least two circuits and may be connected to some
bridges. This implies that in case a kissing point is removed in a graph we obtain a disconnected
graph. The first step in this procedure is to consider all kissing points that are the intersection
of two circuits. These circuits are split by replacing such a kissing point by a bridge. In step
two we consider the kissing points that are the intersection of at least three circuits. Then we
replace such a kissing point by a circuit in which the number of vertices is equal to the number
of circuits and bridges incident to that kissingpoint. Then we have new kissing points, but all
these kissingpoints are incident with at most two circuits. We repeat now the first step of the
procedure. This procedure, which results in a bridge-connected circuit graph, is illustrated in
the following example.
Example 3 The graph G is a bridge-connected cyclic graph and the graph G∗ is the
























































































Let (V,E, i) be a bridge-connected cyclic graph and let (V ,E, i) be the extension. Then
Γ = (M, (V ,E, i, v0), g, t) is called the minimal extension of the delivery problem Γ =
(N, (V,E, i, v0), g, t) if g(e) = g(e) for all e ∈ E, t(e) = t(e) for all e ∈ E and t(e) = 0 for
all e ∈ E − E. Note that N ⊂M .
Lemma 5 Let Γ = (N, (V,E, i, v0), g, t) be a delivery problem and let Γ =
19
(M, (V ,E, i, v0), g, t) be the minimal extension of Γ. Let (N, c) be the delivery game cor-
responding to Γ and let (N, c) be the delivery game corresponding to Γ then
c(S) = c(S) for all S ⊂ N.
PROOF:If in Γ a kissing point is visited in a minimal delivery tour of a coalition S to visit
another circuit then the corresponding minimal delivery tour of S in Γ has to visit the new
bridges and some parts of a new cycle between these two circuits. Since these new edges have
travel costs equal to zero we have that the costs of a minimal delivery tour of S in Γ coincides
with the costs of the corresponding delivery tour of S in Γ. 2 PROOF THEOREM 1: Follows
immediately from theorem 4 and lemma 5. 2
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